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Liberation, Not Independence:

















should	 negotiate	 a	 settlement	 with	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 United	
Kingdom	so	that	Scotland	becomes	an	independent	state.’3
The Nationalists previously affirmed their hope of being ‘Free 
by ’93’; a declaration that still has a frisson that will probably elude 
future	 slogans	 for	 independence.	 ‘Self-driven	 by	 2011’,	 should	
such	branding	ever	be	adopted	by	the	SNP,	does	not	carry	quite	the	
same	punch.	Nevertheless,	at	 the	core	of	 the	nationalist	agenda	 lies	
the	 goal	 of	 self-determination;	 independence	 from	 Westminster’s	
control.	 Knowing	 how	 The Scottish Constitutional Convention	 (an	
association	of	civic	and	political	groups,	 including,	amongst	others,	
churches,	local	authorities,	trades	unions	and	some	political	parties)	







Gordon	 Brown	 had	 published	 a	 Green	 Paper,	 The Governance 








to make its final report later in 2009 but there is no formal end-point 
for	the	National Conversation.	
Revisions	to	the	constitutional	settlement	of	the	United	Kingdom	
continue	 to	 be	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 independence-devolution	
continuum.	 The	 SNP	 consultation	 document	 “Choosing	 Scotland’s	
Future” carries the motto on its cover: ‘Independence and responsibility 
in	the	modern	world’.6	Through	my	engagement	with	Manuel	Castells’	
theory	 of	 the	 network-state	 it	 is	my	 view	 that	 the	SNP	perspective	
fails	to	understand	the	‘modern’	world.	In	this	paper	I	will	interrogate	






My argument has affinity with Will Storrar’s attempt in his 1993 
PhD	 thesis	 to	 articulate	 (and	 recognize)	 a	move	 from	 a	 contextual	















losing power, although not influence.12	Sources	of	authority	and	power	
have	multiplied	since	the	1970s	as	governments	now	have	to	contend	
with	 a	 transnational	 core	 to	 national	 economies,	 namely	 global	
financial markets, transnationalization of production, and production 
and	trade	networks.	The	nation-state:
…	has	 lost	most	 of	 its	 sovereign	 economic	 power,	 although	
it	still	has	some	regulatory	capacity	and	relative	control	over	
its	 subjects.	Yet	 it	 retains	 its	 capacity	 as	 a	 strategic	 actor	 to	
act	 upon	 the	 conditions	 that	 underlie	 the	 performance	 of	 its	
economy.	This	requires	that	the	state	becomes	interdependent	
within	 a	 broader	 network	 of	 economic	 processes	 out	 of	 its	
control.13
The	 new	 paradigm	 is	 the	 network	 of	 inter-connected	 nodes	 rather	
than	 linear	 linkages	 in	 hierarchies	 or	 ‘managing	 centres’.14	Nation-
states	are	nodes,	but	not	necessarily	the	most	powerful.	They	share	the	
network	with	other	sources	of	authority	and	power,	many	of	which	are	
‘undefined, and, sometimes, indefinable’.15	These	include	networks	of	
capital and production but also include highly significant networks 
of	 communication,	 crime,	 international	 organizations,	 transnational	
religions,	 movements	 of	 public	 opinion	 and	 all	 kinds	 of	 social	
movements.16
In	 Scottish	 terms,	 the	 take-over	 of	 HBOS	 by	 Lloyds	 TSB	 is	 a	
good	example	of	the	response	to	networks	of	power	that	are	restricted	
(although	not	of	course	wholly	neutered)	on	the	part	of	both	national	




trafficking is organized by networks of criminals who can make use 
of	 information	 technology	but	 that	 the	practice	 is	 embedded	within	
a	 global	 political	 and	 economic	 system	 which	 is	 itself	 a	 network.	
Although much recent focus has been on financial networks, Castells 
work draws our attention to the flows of power where some nodes 
(and	sub-networks)	are	cultural	whilst	others	are	political.	
Castells’	 claim	 for	 a	 new	 paradigm	 is	 of	 course	 contested.	
He	 is	 accused	 of	 ignoring	 the	 ‘traditional	 underpinning’	 of	 many	
successful	 web-based	 business-to-business	 dealings,19	 or	 an	 almost	
‘anthropocentric approach’ to the financial networks,20	of	prematurely	
relegating	civil	society	‘to	the	dustbin	of	history’21	and	of	fetishizing	
information	and	information	technology	in	his	reductionism.22	Most	
important	 is	 Frank	Webster’s	 critique	 that,	 like	 others,	Castells	 too	
readily identifies discontinuities	 with	 previous	 forms	 of	 social	
organization	and	neglects	historical	continuities.23
Whilst	 I	 agree	 that	 Castells	 is	 stretching	 it	 to	 talk	 of	 network	
replacing	 linearity	 or	 managing-centre	 as	 a	 paradigm	 there	 is	 no	
doubt	that	he	is	describing	how	the	rules	of	the	game	have	changed	
very significantly given the development of information technologies. 
What	 concerns	 us	 more	 immediately	 in	 our	 discussion	 is	 how	 the	
traditional	 political	 language	 of	 ‘independence’	 lies	 within	 the	
old	 linear	 or	 managing-centre	 model.	 An	 agenda	 of	 political	 and	
economic	independence	from,	in	our	case,	Westminster,	had	perhaps	
some	saliency	in	the	1950s	and	1960s	(although	its	political	popularity	
was	 low	 prior	 to	Winnie	 Ewing	 winning	 the	 Hamilton	 by-election	
in	 1967).	 However,	 independence	 seems	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 realities	
of	 globalization	 in	 which	 the	 paradigm	 of	 networks	 (created	 and	
sustained	by	information	technologies)	are	integral.24




of	 the	 21st	 century.	The	 ‘modern	world’	 of	 the	motto	 is	 really	 ‘the	
world	until	 the	 third	quarter	of	 the	20th	century’.	This	 form	of	self-
determination	 is	 politically	 inadequate	 for	 the	 exigencies	 that	 face	







of	 society,	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 global	 politics	 and	 economics.	
What	are	the	grounds	upon	which	we	might	reach	a	decision	regarding	
its	ethical	value?	To	attempt	an	answer	I	turn	to	John	Paul	II	and	his	
personalist	 philosophy.	 In	many	ways	 I	want	 to	 treat	 independence	
in	 a	 similar	way	 to	 the	 former	Pope’s	 consideration	of	work	 in	 his	
encyclical	Laborem exercens.	
In	Laborem exercens John Paul II finds the ethical value of work 
to	 lie	 primarily	 in	 the	 subjective,	 rather	 than	 objective,	 dimension.	
We	classify	types	of	work	objectively	when	we	rate	them	as	perhaps	
menial,	 as	 ‘service’,	 or	 ‘alienating’	 whilst	 to	 other	 activities	 we	
give	 greater	 honour	 such	 as	 those	 contributing	 to	 knowledge,	 to	
theoretical	developments,	to	wealth-creation	or	any	number	of	other	








a person both reveals and fulfils herself, her ‘appropriate structure 
of	 self-governance	 and	 self-possession	 is	 manifested’.29	 This	 must	
not	 be	mistaken	 for	 individualism	which	 sees	 the	 individual	 as	 the	
‘supreme	 and	 fundamental	 good’;30	 it	 is,	 rather,	 an	 eschewal	 of	 the	
abstract	 in	 favour	of	 the	 concrete	 ‘acting-person’	 and	 a	 recognition	
that it is together with others that we reach our fulfillment. Our 
‘participation’	with	 others	 is	 always	 as	 an	 acting-person;	 any	 other	
form	of	collaboration	 is	merely	doing	 things	 together	 (whether	 that	
be freely chosen or under the influence of powerful voices or mass 
psychology).	 This	 personalist	 approach	 requires	 that	 we	 carefully	
consider	 how	 we	 use	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘community’	 or	 ‘compatriots’	




Personalism demands that we think first of ‘communities of acting’ 





qualifications for inclusion in that group, this is ethically problematic. 
‘The	Scottish	people’	are	mistakenly	attributed	with	what	John	Paul	
II,	 in	 other	 contexts,	 calls	 ‘a	 quasi-subjectiveness’.33	 It	 is	mistaken	
because	whilst	they	are	people	exercising	a	common	action	(of	sorts),	
‘the	Scottish	people’	 is	not	a	new	subject	of	acting.	Although	being	





does	 national	 independence	 contribute	 towards	 authentic	 human	
fulfillment understood in terms of participation?34 That fulfillment 
may	include	a	sense	of	national	social,	cultural	and	political	identity	
but	it	is	not	coterminous	with	it.	Scottish	independence	might,	despite	
my	concerns	about	its	political	inadequacy,	work	quite	well	on its own 
terms	but	my	contention	is	that	such	terms	are	ethically	inadequate.	
Theological	inadequacy	
Whilst	 I	 in	 no	way	wish	 to	 suggest	 that	 John	 Paul	 II’s	 personalist	
philosophy	 is	 not	 profoundly	 theological,	 I	 believe	we	 can	 still	 go	
further	in	our	critique	of	independence	by	taking	the	route	of	Jürgen	
Moltmann’s	liberative	Christology.




theological reflections from the centre – that being the resurrection 
of the crucified Christ and the cross of the risen Christ.36	He	attempts	








movements’	 in	 the	 abstract	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 reaching	 generalisable	
conclusions	 that	 would	 speak	 to	 every	 ‘nationalism’	 ripped	 out	 of	
its	context.	 It	 is	not	my	 intention	 to	 rule	out	national	 independence	
as	 a	 theologically	 valid	 response	 in	 any	 and	 all	 circumstances.	 For	
example,	Africans’	independence	from	colonial	control	or	the	Baltic	
states	 breaking	 free	 from	 the	Soviet	Union	 each	 require	 evaluation	
within	 their	 own	 context.	 The	 historical	 and	 cultural	 particularities	
in	which	we	 face	 the	question	of	Scottish	national	 independence	 is	
that	of	 shortly	being	asked	 to	express	our	view	on	moving	 towards	
an	 independence	referendum,	possibly	within	 the	next	 three	or	 four	
years. My anchoring of the discussion here within a specific context is 
directly	related	to	the	personalist	approach	expounded	in	the	previous	
section.	We	 locate	 the	 ethical	 value	 of	 independence	 in	 the	 acting-
person	and	therefore	we	must	not	avoid	the	concrete	realities	of	what	
doing	 independence	means	 in	 2009,	 2010	 or	 2011	 –	whenever	 the	
promised	referendum	is	held.	This	reasoning	further	demands	that	we	
consider	our	partners	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	(from	whom	the	SNP	
wish	 to	 be	 ‘independent’)	 as	who	 they	 are	now,	 not	 as	 generalized	
‘English’	constructed	 from	mythical	 relationships	between	Scotland	
and	England	in	either	the	distant	or	more	recent	past.38	
The crucified God challenges us to reject the priority given to 
‘identity’	in	discussions	about	Scottish	independence	and	nationalism	




else).	 Such	 a	 hermeneutic	 relativizes	 all	 discussions	 about	 political	
structure	 to	 questions	of	 ‘freedom’.	This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 national	
identity	can	never	be	an	‘anticipation’	–	but	only	if	it	is	necessary	for	
specific liberation (of a kind that I will consider below).




(rather	 than	 network).	National	 identity	 is	 apiece	with	 notions	 that	
‘everyone	 is	 for	 everyone	 else	 merely	 the	 limitation	 of	 his	 own	
freedom’	as	Moltmann	critiques	effectively	in	his	The Trinity and the 
Kingdom of God.42





is	 a	 coalition	 of	 identities	 that	 we	 observe	 in	 its	 effervescence	
only.43	 Furthermore,	 these	 sub-themes	 of	 national	 identity	may	 not	








Further, the resurrection of the crucified Christ that unfolds into 
the	boundary-breaking	outpouring	of	the	Spirit	profoundly	questions	
the	 statements	 that	 are	 explicit	 and	 implicit	 in	 drawing	 boundaries	
between	 ‘Scottish’	 and	 ‘not-Scottish’.	 Again,	 this	 does	 not	 annul	
national	 identity	 per se	 but	 it	 interrogates	 what	 choosing	 to	 assert	
Scottish	 nationalism	means	 at	 the	 level	 of	 inter-personal	 relations.	
Although	much	of	the	nationalist	debate	can	be	framed	with	reference	
to	 ‘the	 English	 state’	 or	 the	 ‘Westminster	 Parliament’	 we	 are	 not	
thereby	absolved	from	taking	into	consideration	our	message	as	people	
in	Scotland	to	actual	people	in	England,	Wales,	or	Northern	Ireland.	
We	do	not	 thereby	concede	a	veto	 to	each	 individual	 in	 the	United	
Kingdom	but	we	are	not	to	neglect	the	human	dimension.45








of	nature,	 and	of	 senselessness	 and	godforsakenness.47	Whilst	 there	





politically	and	ethically	 inadequate.	Castells’	 attention	 to	a	network 
society	 and	network-states	 tells	us	 that,	 at	 least	 to	 some	extent,	 the	
rules	 of	 the	 game	 have	 changed.	 Scottish	 independence	 must	 be	
justified in terms of its contribution to overcoming the circles of death; 
and	not	just	because	this	is	politically	expedient	but,	as	I	hope	I	have	
shown	 via	Moltmann’s	 presentation	 of	 the	 political	 implications	 of	
the crucified God, on theological terms. John Paul II’s articulation 
of	personalism	in	which	participation	is	critically	important	requires	
us	to	locate	the	ethical	value	of	Scottish	independence	in	those	who	
action it. Independence is dignified to the extent that the dignity of 
those who practice it (and live within it) is affirmed. Crucially, that 
dignity	is	inextricably	bound	up	with	how	we	dignify	other	people.	
In	 framing	 the	 National	 Conversation,	 “Choosing	 Scotland’s	
Future” can appear to resonate with the liberative values for which I 
have	been	arguing.	Section	2	is	an	interesting	example	where	it	makes	










an	 imminent	 choice	 and	Scottish	 independence	must	make	 its	 case	
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